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1. Introduction 
Early informal economy literature studies 
have yielded, surprisingly, positive results on the 
effect of corruption on growth through «speeding 
money and avoiding delays in bureaucracy» (Leff 
(1964), Huntington (1968)) [7, 12]. Later, however, 
in the corruption literature it was argued that 
corruption lowers economic growth negatively 
affecting institutions or through reducing investment 
(Shleifer et al (1993)) [18]. Then a huge number of 
studies have been followed by the research on the 
relationship between the institutional quality, 
governance and economic activity, growth and 
development.  
Generally most authors show positive 
growth impact of governance, even though some 
researchers, argues that there is a negative correlation 
in good quality of the institution and economic 
growth using the argument that rapid growth brings 
about political instability (Olson 1963) [16].  
In this context, this paper aims to distinguish 
the positive or negative effect of governance on 
development outcomes. In particular this research is 
designed to examine the development effect of 
governance. Main focus will be on empirical 
methodology of testing whether governance affects 
development through exogenous variables.  
In order to put the plan into operation, 
instrumental variables estimator and two-stage least 
squares methods are going to be used to test the 
governance and development relationship. Empirical 
analysis is built on a cross-sectional regression of 
gross domestic product as an indicator of 
development on main governance indicator – 
effectiveness of governing for 64 countries [21, 22]. 
The paper is structured as follows. Literature 
review in Section II is followed by the empirical 
model specification in section III. Then data 
description is going to be described in Section IV. 
The next section reports the empirical findings. 
Section VI concludes the interpretation of the results 
and suggests further research directions. 
 
2. Material and Methods  
Early literature on unofficial economy has 
very interesting suggestions regarding corruption 
effect on economic growth. According to Leff (1964) 
[12] and Huntington (1968) (i) [7] corrupt practices 
prevent bureaucratic delays; (ii) bribe encourages 
government employees to work harder. The former 
mechanism enhances growth only in countries with 
burdensome regulations, while the latter operates in 
any country.  
Thus economic growth could be raised if 
there was corruption. Also Olson (1963) argues that 
economic growth leads to political instability [16]. In 
turn political variables affect long run growth rates 
(Levine and Renelt (1992)) [13]. From this point of 
view one could summarize that the early literature on 
unofficial economy yielded controversial results: 
negative relationship between economic growth and 
institutions, and positive correlation between 
economic growth and corruption. 
On the other hand more recent studies 
disagree on the previous results and most authors find 
evidence suggesting completely opposite results. 
Starting with Mauro (1995) who first attempted the 
systematic cross-country empirical analysis relating 
corruption and efficiency to economic growth, yields 
a negative correlation between corruption and 
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investment, then between corruption and growth [15]. 
The result is not at odds with Ades and DiTella 
(1996) who argue that the lack of competition and 
weak legal institutions enhance corruption further 
affecting the foreign investment. It has to be noted 
that many researchers study the relationship between 
corruption, investment and growth variables [2].  
Building upon on endogenous growth model 
Loyaza (1996) shows that the growth in the informal 
sector size leads to lowered economic growth. 
Positive dependence of the informal sector on tax 
burden and labor market restrictions which in turn 
negatively depends on the quality of government 
institutions has been shown by Loyaza [14]. However 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) argue 
that higher taxes or more regulation does not 
necessarily define the size of unofficial economy, but 
rather the state administrative system itself can 
determine the size of unofficial economy [5]. 
The reverse causality between institutional 
quality and economic growth has been shown by 
Chong and Calderon (1999) building on previous 
cross-section studies. Indeed there is not only the 
institutional quality impact on economic growth, but 
the causal effect growth is also possible [3].  
The causal effect between governance and 
economic development is also in the focus of 
Kaufmann and Kraay’s research (2002) that, 
surprisingly, shows the negative impact of an income 
per capita on governance. 
It has to be noted that instrumental variables 
methods is widely used by researchers to investigate 
the role of various governance measures in 
development. Instrumenting the institutional quality 
in East Asian countries Rodrik (1997) shows that 
good governance is required in terms of development 
and growth performance [17]. Hall and Jones (1999) 
using instrumental variables method show that 
government policies and institutions determine the 
long run economic performance. They treat historical 
location and language as the key determinants of an 
endogenous factor − social infrastructure, which 
according to the authors’ definition is institutions and 
government policies [6]. Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Lobaton (1999) following the same methodology find 
that governance play crucial role for economic 
outcomes. They used the share of population 
speaking major European languages as an instrument 
and regressed GDP per capita (then development 
indicators) on instrumented six indicators of 
governance which they aggregated [10, 11]. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use settler 
mortality as an instrument assuming that it could be 
historical determinant of institutions, whereas 
Easterly and Levine (2001) use geographic 
endowments as an instrument controlling for 
institution and regressing economic development on 
institution measures. They find the evidence for the 
direct effect of exogenous variables through 
institutions on development [1, 4]. 
Given the controversial results of early 
literature on unofficial economy and more recent 
studies yielding opposite results, this study reassesses 
the relationship between governance and 
development.  
In particular, causal effect running from 
governance to GDP per capita is going to be assessed 
empirically using conventional instruments but taking 
several instruments as exogenous variables at the 
same time. Essentially the purpose of the paper is to 
assess the application of instrumental variables 
methods proposed by previous authors in the 
governance-development context.  
The choice of per capita incomes (GDP per 
capita PPP in current US dollars) as one of the 
development indicator and the governance 
effectiveness as one dimension of a governance is 
argued well enough in Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). 
Instead of repeating the arguments here, I proceed 
further assuming the variables are reasonable. Reader 
is referred to the original papers for further details 
[8]. 
In order to empirically specify the model 
building upon the model presented by Kaufmann 
(1999), Hall and Jones (1999) let’s start with the 
following simple specification [6, 9]: 
                  (1) 
where  is a log of per capita GDP,  - 
government effectiveness, - error term.  
Since the determining factors of cross-
country differences are excluded from the model the 
error term reflects the measurement errors. The 
measurement error in GDP itself is also captured by 
this error term. It has to be noted that omitted 
variables bias in OLS can occur depending on how 
strong the error term is correlated with the 
governance. Governance has not random distribution 
across countries.  
Governance depends on social and political 
history of a country. Historically inherited institutions 
by former colonial countries are likely to result in 
relatively better governance. Therefore governance 
can be written as following: 
                    (2) 
where  is a set of additional unobservable 
determinants,  is a zero-mean error term that 
reflects unobservable governance determinants. The 
sign of governance effect on explained variable 
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determines whether the OLS estimates of (1) is 
biased upward or downwards. 
Because governance itself is not exactly 
measured observed governance indicator provides a 
noisy signal of “true” governance: 
                              (3) 
where  is a zero-mean disturbance term 
that captures the measurement error. Assuming  is 
independent of  and  one could get: 
              (4) 
         (5) 
                        (6) 
Observed governance determinants should 
be uncorrelated with the error term in equation (6), 
i.e. . Also measurement error in 
governance effectiveness should be uncorrelated with 
a zero-mean disturbance term  . 
Only in this case instruments  will be valid. In 
such a way omitted variables bias can be addressed 
using twostage least squares (2SLS). 
Two groups of instrumental variables have 
been chosen for the specified model. First, settler 
mortality presented by Acemoglu et al (2001), 
secondly, ethnolinguistic fractionalization proposed 
by Mauro (1995) will be used to instrument the 
governance efficiency. Settler mortality is a mortality 
rate faced by European settlers at the time of 
colonization centuries of XVIII and XIX (Teorell, 
2010). This variable shows the historical influence of 
Western European colonial powers over the past 
several centuries, which have brought along 
institutional foundations to the colonial countries. 
The choice of the second set of instruments which is 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures “the 
probability of two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group” (Taylor and Hudson (1972)). 
Higher level of this index means that the country is 
highly fragmented. Both of the instruments are 
assumed to be exogenous to economic outcome. 
They are good proxies that might have effect on 
economic variables through institutional efficiency 
[19, 20]. 
The cross country analysis is based on the 
data for 64 countries. Governance indicator is drawn 
from the World Bank Governance and Anti-
corruption group which constructed six aggregated 
indicators of governance on the basis of quantitative 
(ratings of commercial risk rating agencies) and 
descriptive data (cross country surveys of 
international and nongovernmental organizations). 
For the purpose of this research only one dimension 
of governance that is government effectiveness will 
be used from six clustered indicators. According to 
World Bank governance defined as “traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised” and government effectiveness as “a 
measure of the quality of public and civil services, 
policy formulation and implementation”. (Kaufmann 
and Mastruzzi (2010)). 
Data on GDP per capita in US dollars 
adjusted for purchasing power parity is obtained from 
World Bank Development Indicators. 
Settler mortality is drawn from Acemoglu et 
al (2001 cited in Teorell, 2010). The index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is measured as an 
average value of ethnolinguisic variables taken from 
Muller (1964), Roberts (1962) and Atlas Narodov 
Mira (1964) (cited in Teorell, 2010). 
 
3. Results  
Hausman endogeneity test conducted in 
order to define whether it is better to estimate the 
model using OLS or IV suggests that the consistency 
of the OLS should be rejected and 2SLS has to be 
used instead. According to the results of the 
appropriateness test of OLS or IV/GMM it is 
observed that chi-square is 7.16 with p-value of 
0.0074 which means null hypothesis that the OLS 
estimator consistent is rejected and provides support 
for using TSLS (Table 1). 
Also the Hausman test for whether a 
regressor is endogenous can be performed comparing 
OLS and IV coefficients of endogenous variables. 
The coefficient of government effectiveness has an 
OLS estimate of 1.26 differing from the IV estimate 
of 2.89. We can see the loss in precision in using IV; 
in particular standard errors are almost doubled 
which questions the efficiency of IV (Table 2). 
However the post estimation Durdin-Wu-
Hausman test which uses augmented regressors and 
produces a robust test statistic provides evidence that 
the governance efficiency is endogenous. Both 
robustified chi-squared score and F-statistics’ p-value 
rejects the null that variable is exogenous (robust 
score chi2(1) = 7.73287, p = 0.0054; robust 
regression F(1,55) = 14.3797, p = 0.0004) (Table 3). 
Testing the relevance of the instruments, 
performed on the basis of Shea, Anderson, Cragg and 
Donald’s approaches, suggests that instruments are 
relevant. According to the first stage results, Shea's 
partial R-squared, which measures the relevance of 
exogenous variables considering intercorrelations 
among instruments, is 0.23 and Cragg-Donald’s F 
test of the excluded instruments rejects its null 
hypothesis of underidentification. The partial R-
squared is the same as Shea's partial R-squared 
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because the model has only one endogenous 
regressor. Anderson’s canonical correllation statistic 
(0.0022) rejects its null hypothesis and suggests that 
the instruments are adequate to identify the equation 
(Table 4). 
 
 
Table 1. Hausman endogeneity test 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0074
                          =        7.16
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
       _cons       8.30708     8.287159        .0199209        .0074433
voice_acco~t      .0480542     .1322416       -.0841874        .0314559
    req_qual     -.2977238     .2567823       -.5545061        .2071863
    rule_law     -1.063385    -.3945011       -.6688841        .2499227
    pol_stab     -.1453677    -.1482338        .0028661        .0010709
  contr_corr     -.4104061    -.1142448       -.2961613        .1106581
     gov_eff      2.885961     1.260824        1.625138        .6072185
                                                                              
                   ivreg          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of OLS and IV coefficients of endogenous variables 
               avef ef_anm
Instruments:   contr_corr pol_stab rule_law req_qual voice_account sett_mort
Instrumented:  gov_eff
                                                                              
       _cons      8.30708   .1156636    71.82   0.000     8.080383    8.533777
voice_acco~t     .0480542   .2071066     0.23   0.817    -.3578673    .4539757
    req_qual    -.2977238   .3044945    -0.98   0.328     -.894522    .2990745
    rule_law    -1.063385   .4819552    -2.21   0.027       -2.008   -.1187704
    pol_stab    -.1453677   .1507101    -0.96   0.335    -.4407541    .1500188
  contr_corr    -.4104061   .3761824    -1.09   0.275     -1.14771    .3268979
     gov_eff     2.885961    .731653     3.94   0.000     1.451948    4.319975
                                                                              
     log_gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .66181
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4867
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(6)  =  117.86
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      63
                                                                              
       _cons     .4122534   .1716779     2.40   0.020     .0680599    .7564469
      ef_anm     .3574426   .2532851     1.41   0.164    -.1503635    .8652487
        avef     -.227235   .2657289    -0.86   0.396    -.7599894    .3055194
   sett_mort    -10.65737   3.295326    -3.23   0.002     -17.2641   -4.050641
voice_acco~t     .0411232   .0824336     0.50   0.620    -.1241461    .2063926
    req_qual     .3255121   .0839374     3.88   0.000     .1572277    .4937965
    rule_law     .2980488   .1244032     2.40   0.020     .0486355    .5474621
    pol_stab      .065505   .0512308     1.28   0.206    -.0372066    .1682167
  contr_corr     .1861667   .1050135     1.77   0.082    -.0243728    .3967062
                                                                              
     gov_eff        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.2106
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.9167
                                                  R-squared       =     0.9274
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000
                                                  F(   8,     54) =     129.42
                                                  Number of obs   =         63
                       
First-stage regressions
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Table 3. Durdin-Wu-Hausman test 
               avef ef_anm
Instruments:   contr_corr pol_stab rule_law req_qual voice_account sett_mort
Instrumented:  gov_eff
                                                                              
       _cons      8.30708   .1156636    71.82   0.000     8.080383    8.533777
voice_acco~t     .0480542   .2071066     0.23   0.817    -.3578673    .4539757
    req_qual    -.2977238   .3044945    -0.98   0.328     -.894522    .2990745
    rule_law    -1.063385   .4819552    -2.21   0.027       -2.008   -.1187704
    pol_stab    -.1453677   .1507101    -0.96   0.335    -.4407541    .1500188
  contr_corr    -.4104061   .3761824    -1.09   0.275     -1.14771    .3268979
     gov_eff     2.885961    .731653     3.94   0.000     1.451948    4.319975
                                                                              
     log_gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .66181
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4867
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000
                                                       Wald chi2(6)  =  117.86
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      63
 
 
  Robust regression F(1,55)       =  14.3797  (p = 0.0004)
  Robust score chi2(1)            =  7.73287  (p = 0.0054)
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Tests of endogeneity
 
 
Evaluating the correlation degree between 
the instruments and endogenous regressor it appears 
that the ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not 
correlated with the government effectiveness and 
only settler mortality passes the test of instrument 
correlation with regressor. Nevertheless the next 
stage - instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
shows that endogenous regressor government 
efficiency has an IV coefficient which is well 
distinguished from zero and conditioning on other 
factors government effectiveness appears to play an 
important role in determining the gross domestic 
product (Table 5). 
Test of over identifying restrictions which 
helps to test the validity of the instruments suggests 
that the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated cannot be rejected at 1% level which 
means that the over identifying restriction is valid. 
However at 5% critical value level the null could be 
rejected signaling that the specification could be 
improved and better instrument should be identified. 
Alternatively two of the instruments which are less or 
not related to the endogenous variable could be 
dropped, although it cannot ensure that the problem 
will be resolved since we will not be able to test the 
validity of the instrument because model will be just-
identified (Table 6). 
If the errors are not independently and 
identically distributed IV and TSLS are result in 
consistent but inefficient estimates in which case 
better to use GMM. Also GMM generates 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors which are 
helpful in the context of heteroscedasticity problems. 
For the efficient GMM estimator, the test statistic is 
Hansen's J statistic which is the minimized value of 
the GMM criterion function. Comparing GMM with 
2SLS of our reestimated model ensures that the 
government effectiveness still plays significant role 
in the equation and Hansen’s J statistic confirms the 
independence of the instruments and the disturbance 
process (p-val =0.0135) (Table 7). 
Having tested the entire set of 
overidentifying restrictions with Hansen-Sargan tests 
we could proceed further in detail evaluating 
particular subsets of excluded instruments using 
difference-in-Sargan test (C test). However this test is 
for models with very large sets of instruments and 
our model does not contain large number of 
instruments. Therefore we can carry on with the 
heteroscedasticity test.  
In the context of IV testing for 
heteroscedasticity is important to check whether the 
errors are not conditionally heteroscedastic. Stata 
uses Pagan and Hall test which is similar to the 
Breusch-Pagan and White tests. The idea behind the 
test is checking whether the errors are conditionally 
heteroscedastic depending on the possibility of 
exogenous variables to predict the squared residuals. 
The test using the levels of the instruments as 
associated variables and using fitted value and its 
square shows that there is no problem with 
heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term of the 
model (Table 8). 
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Table 4. Testing the relevance of the instruments 
                                                                              
Excluded instruments: sett_mort avef ef_anm
Included instruments: contr_corr pol_stab rule_law req_qual voice_account
Instrumented:         gov_eff
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0117
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           8.903
                                                                              
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal IV size              7.80
                                         20% maximal IV size              9.54
                                         15% maximal IV size             12.83
                                         10% maximal IV size             22.30
                                         30% maximal IV relative bias     5.39
                                         20% maximal IV relative bias     6.46
                                         10% maximal IV relative bias     9.08
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:  5% maximal IV relative bias    13.91
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                5.417
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0022
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          14.574
                                                                              
       _cons      8.30708   .1076274    77.18   0.000     8.096134    8.518026
voice_acco~t     .0480542   .1941899     0.25   0.805     -.332551    .4286593
    req_qual    -.2977238    .388419    -0.77   0.443    -1.059011    .4635636
    rule_law    -1.063385   .4931857    -2.16   0.031    -2.030011   -.0967591
    pol_stab    -.1453677   .1555483    -0.93   0.350    -.4502367    .1595014
  contr_corr    -.4104061   .3438282    -1.19   0.233    -1.084297    .2634847
     gov_eff     2.885961   .7794868     3.70   0.000     1.358195    4.413728
                                                                              
     log_gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Residual SS             =  27.59316507                Root MSE      =    .6618
Total (uncentered) SS   =  4028.047787                Uncentered R2 =   0.9931
Total (centered) SS     =  53.75979371                Centered R2   =   0.4867
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                                      F(  6,    56) =    11.99
                                                      Number of obs =       63
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only
                    
IV (2SLS) estimation
Number of excluded instruments       L1 =          3
Number of instruments                L  =          9
Number of regressors                 K  =          7
Number of observations               N  =         63
Stock-Wright LM S statistic  Chi-sq(3)=25.66     P-val=0.0000
Anderson-Rubin Wald test     Chi-sq(3)=43.29     P-val=0.0000
Anderson-Rubin Wald test     F(3,54)=  12.37     P-val=0.0000
Ho: B1=0 and overidentifying restrictions are valid
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation
Weak-instrument-robust inference
See main output for Cragg-Donald weak id test critical values
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic                       5.42
Ho: equation is weakly identified
Weak identification test
Cragg-Donald N*CDEV Wald statistic          Chi-sq(3)=18.96    P-val=0.0003
Anderson canon. corr. N*CCEV LM statistic   Chi-sq(3)=14.57    P-val=0.0022
Ha: matrix has rank=K1 (identified)
Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified)
Underidentification tests
gov_eff     |     0.2313      |     0.2313      |        5.42       0.0025
Variable    | Shea Partial R2 |   Partial R2    |  F(  3,    54)    P-value
                                           
Summary results for first-stage regressions
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Table 5. Evaluating the Correlation Degree Between the Instruments and Endogenous Regressor 
                                                                              
               avef ef_anm
Instruments:   contr_corr pol_stab rule_law req_qual voice_account sett_mort
Instrumented:  gov_eff
                                                                              
       _cons      8.30708   .1141561    72.77   0.000     8.078398    8.535762
voice_acco~t     .0480542   .2059694     0.23   0.816    -.3645522    .4606605
    req_qual    -.2977238   .4119806    -0.72   0.473     -1.12302    .5275726
    rule_law    -1.063385   .5231024    -2.03   0.047    -2.111285   -.0154852
    pol_stab    -.1453677   .1649839    -0.88   0.382    -.4758701    .1851347
  contr_corr    -.4104061   .3646848    -1.13   0.265    -1.140958    .3201454
     gov_eff     2.885961   .8267706     3.49   0.001     1.229741    4.542182
                                                                              
     log_gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    53.7597937    62  .867093447           Root MSE      =  .70195
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4317
    Residual    27.5931651    56  .492735091           R-squared     =  0.4867
       Model    26.1666286     6  4.36110477           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    56) =   11.99
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      63
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
                                                                              
       _cons     .4122534    .150212     2.74   0.008     .1110964    .7134104
      ef_anm     .3574426   .2517847     1.42   0.161    -.1473554    .8622406
        avef     -.227235    .244502    -0.93   0.357    -.7174321    .2629621
   sett_mort    -10.65737   3.106394    -3.43   0.001    -16.88532   -4.429427
voice_acco~t     .0411232    .061046     0.67   0.503    -.0812666    .1635131
    req_qual     .3255121   .0910705     3.57   0.001     .1429269    .5080974
    rule_law     .2980488   .1271933     2.34   0.023     .0430416    .5530561
    pol_stab      .065505   .0523124     1.25   0.216     -.039375     .170385
  contr_corr     .1861667    .103732     1.79   0.078    -.0218035    .3941369
                                                                              
     gov_eff        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    33.0131652    62  .532470406           Root MSE      =  .21061
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9167
    Residual    2.39515175    54  .044354662           R-squared     =  0.9274
       Model    30.6180134     8  3.82725168           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,    54) =   86.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      63
                       
First-stage regressions
 
 
Table 6. Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions 
   Wu-Hausman F(1,55)              =  8.06684  (p = 0.0063)
  Durbin (score) chi2(1)          =  8.05829  (p = 0.0045)
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Tests of endogeneity
 
 
Summing up, IV is more appropriate in 
comparison with OLS according to Hausman 
endogeneity test due to the endogeneity problem, 
however there is a possibility of loss in precision. 
Postestimation DWH test suggests that the 
governance efficiency should be treated as 
endogenous variable. Testing the relevance of 
instruments suggests that the instruments are 
adequate to identify the equation. Although 
evaluating the correlation degree between the 
instruments and endogenous regressor shows that the 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not correlated with 
the government effectiveness and only settler 
mortality passes the test of instrument correlation 
with regressor. Nevertheless the next stage - 
instrumental variables (2SLS) regression shows that 
endogenous regressor government efficiency has an 
IV coefficient which is well distinguished from zero 
and conditioning on other factors government 
effectiveness appears to play an important role in 
determining the gross domestic product. Test of 
overidentifying restrictions suggests that the 
instruments are valid at 1% level, but at 5% critical 
value level the null could be rejected signaling that 
the specification could be improved and better 
instrument should be identified. There is no problem 
with heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term of the 
model according to Pagan and Hall test. 
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Table 7. GMM and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
                                                                              
Excluded instruments: sett_mort avef ef_anm
Included instruments: contr_corr pol_stab rule_law req_qual voice_account
Instrumented:         gov_eff
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0135
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         8.614
                                                                              
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors.
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal IV size              7.80
                                         20% maximal IV size              9.54
                                         15% maximal IV size             12.83
                                         10% maximal IV size             22.30
                                         30% maximal IV relative bias     5.39
                                         20% maximal IV relative bias     6.46
                                         10% maximal IV relative bias     9.08
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:  5% maximal IV relative bias    13.91
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          6.111
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0205
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):              9.786
                                                                              
       _cons     8.329996   .1038438    80.22   0.000     8.126466    8.533526
voice_acco~t     .0551289   .2069697     0.27   0.790    -.3505242     .460782
    req_qual    -.1982798   .3017153    -0.66   0.511    -.7896308    .3930713
    rule_law    -.8140628    .468295    -1.74   0.082    -1.731904    .1037784
    pol_stab    -.1182672   .1500971    -0.79   0.431    -.4124521    .1759177
  contr_corr    -.5629419    .362928    -1.55   0.121    -1.274268    .1483838
     gov_eff      2.60906    .721267     3.62   0.000     1.195403    4.022717
                                                                              
     log_gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Residual SS             =  25.33074603                Root MSE      =    .6341
Total (uncentered) SS   =  4028.047787                Uncentered R2 =   0.9937
Total (centered) SS     =  53.75979371                Centered R2   =   0.5288
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                                      F(  6,    56) =    19.22
                                                      Number of obs =       63
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity
                     
2-Step GMM estimation
 
 
Table 8. Testing for Heteroscedasticity in the IV context 
    Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg :   9.888  Chi-sq(6) P-value = 0.1295
    White/Koenker nR2 test statistic    :  10.322  Chi-sq(6) P-value = 0.1117
    Pagan-Hall test w/assumed normality :   5.719  Chi-sq(6) P-value = 0.4554
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :   5.904  Chi-sq(6) P-value = 0.4341
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic
IV heteroskedasticity test(s) using levels of IVs only
 
    Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg :   0.807  Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.6680
    White/Koenker nR2 test statistic    :   0.843  Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.6562
    Pagan-Hall test w/assumed normality :   0.495  Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.7808
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :   0.484  Chi-sq(2) P-value = 0.7850
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic
IV heteroskedasticity test(s) using fitted value (X-hat*beta-hat) & its square
 
 
4. Discussions  
The results of key specification tests show 
that the p-value associated with the null hypothesis 
that the instruments affect income through their 
effects on governance is equal to p = 0.0117 (Sargan 
(score) chi2(2) = 8.90). The test barely passes the test 
at 1% critical value level which indicates one should 
not be satisfied with the instruments identified. 
Although still the null is not rejected and gives 
support for identifying assumptions  
and . Thus the tests of overidentifying 
restrictions do pass and government efficiency is 
important for economic outcome which is in our case 
GDP per capita.  
Summarizing the strength of the instruments 
it was observed that the F-statistic from the first-stage 
regressions of governance indicator on the 
instruments is highly significant ( F(8, 54) = 129.42) 
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which means that the instruments have explanatory 
power for governance. In summary, the specification 
tests suggest that the IV estimator is producing 
consistent estimates of β and captures the causal 
effect from governance to gross domestic product 
(per capita income). 
The results obtained are consistent with the 
empirical findings of Kaufmann and Kraay (1999) 
who found large and highly significant positive 
effects of governance on per capita incomes on larger 
sample. 
The research could be further developed by 
assessing the effect of governance looking at other or 
all dimensions (possibly all together) on social 
development indicators as adult literacy or infant 
mortality. Alternatively causal effect running in the 
opposite direction from per capita incomes to 
governance would be interesting to investigate which 
surprisingly has negative correlation according to 
Kaufmann (2002). 
Governance as measured by governance 
effectiveness in the specified model plays important 
role for economic outcome. The evidence for a 
positive causal relationship of governance and 
development has been provided in the paper. 
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